

Effective Governance in Sport: Learning from Failure

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Topics I will address

- **1. Governance red flags for failure;**
- **2. The role of the Code of Conduct and sign off;**
- **3. Importance of risk and internal audit;**
- **4. Connection between risk, culture and pay;**
- **5. Whistle-blowing and a protected channel;**
- **6. Company culture and the board's role;**
- **7. Communication, education and controls;**
- **8. Technology: social media, reputation risk;**
- **9. Tone at the top, and now in the middle;**
- **10. Questions and answers;**

There is not an excuse that I have not heard

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- “It doesn’t apply to our sector or organization.”;
- “It costs too much.”;
- “It is too difficult to implement.”;
- “We have never done it this way.”;
- “Regulators lack jurisdiction to tell us what to do”;
- “There is no relationship between governance and performance.”;
- “It is the law of unintended consequences”;
- “It is one sized fits all approach.”;

Caveat:

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**I am an expert in governance,
accountability & ethics, not in
sport.**

**This is a resource deck and I
will position it as such.**

- Two sporting organizations;
- Health and safety, highly regulated company;
- Rail company;
- Two large IT companies;
- Two mining / oil companies;
- Global construction and aerospace companies;
- Pharmaceutical company;
- Religious organization with priests accused of wrongdoing;
- Two organizations with employees accused of sexual assault;

Continuing changes in governance

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northern rock

BEAR STEARNS

WALL ST

WALI MAIN

REPO 105
TOP SECRET BALANCE SHEET INNOVATION FACILITY

NO TRESPASSING
VIOLATORS WILL VANISH WITHOUT A TRACE

HBOS plc

RECESSION

AIG

Bank of America

Black Swan

Freddie Mac

GMAC

Chrysler Financial

Fannie Mae

CHRYSLER

Merrill Lynch

citibank

FRC

GM

RBS

PRICE REDUCED FORECLOSURE BANK OWNED

150 YEARS of SOLITUDE

Goldman

FRC Financial Reporting Council

September 2012

The UK Corporate Governance Code

Banking

SHAME

CAP GREEK

FSB FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD

OECD EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision

A review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industry entities
Final recommendations
26 November 2009

Playing Many Sides of a Deal
Banks often borrow money from outside entities. Before Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in 2008, it borrowed from a special purpose vehicle with which it had other ties.

Compensation Principles and Standards Assessment Methodology

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

KING CODE OF GOVERNANCE FOR SOUTH AFRICA 2009

The President's Working Group on Financial Markets

Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, H.R. 4173

FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices

SENIOR SUPERVISORS GROUP

Principles for enhancing corporate governance

What does governance failure look like?

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What was my role and what happened?

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- Called in by board, regulator, police, monitor, judge, law firm;
- Bribery and corruption within the company and board;
- Property destruction and death;
- Stock manipulation and fraudulent financial statements (several);
- Sexual assaults (two);
- Improper expenses;
- Extensive lawsuits against directors: “I will [mess] up his life”;
- Significant fines and loss of reputation;
- Interviews of fraudsters (prison in three cases);



- Access to any personnel or any document;
- Directors and employees instructed: full cooperation;
- Confidential interviews and triangulation;
- Reporting to regulators and endorsement of recommendations;
- Recommendations and implementation: 6, 12, 18 month timelines;
- Broader: 150 organizations; > 500 interviews;
- Other experts, including forensic accountants;

- Organizations who believe governance best practices do not apply to them, to their sector, etc.;
- Weak oversight functions and board line of sight;
- Weak risk oversight and internal audit in particular;
- Weak internal control environment, immature internal controls (existence, design, implementation);
- Tone at top not consistent, consequential (to come);
- Lack of documentation of risk appetite framework;

Findings: Red flags for governance failure

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- Absence of governance documentation and transparency to members;
- Board and members not approving management pay;
- Focus on performance not tied to risk or ethics;
- Lack of independent directors with no relations to sector, industry or management;
- Ignorant directors who are self serving, conflict seeking, and beholden to management;

■ Over-tenured, entrenched directors and executives:

- A dominant Executive Committee and CEO;
- Defective background checks at CEO, staff and director appointment stage;
- Nepotism, social capture vs director competencies;
- Inadequate Code of Conduct: Design, implement;
- Culture, integrity & their controls not audited;
- No executive sessions by board and committees;
- Faulty tone at the top (see video);

Tone at Top: A Good Example

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Group-think and directors not speaking up

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"All those in favor say 'Aye.'"

"Aye."

"Aye."

"Aye."

"Aye."

"Aye."

- Whistle-blowing program run by management, and neither anonymous nor rewarding;
- Flawed internal investigation and no confidence in it;
- Wrongdoer: dominant, bullying & charming, charismatic, high performing;
- Wrongdoing starts small, then capture, then bullying; then slippery slope of wrong doing (see video);
- Dysfunctional behavior enabled rather than stopped;
- Toxic internal culture: Ignorant or complacent board;
- Poor crisis management (see video)

Crisis Management: A Good Example

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Why don't people speak up?

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7 Social Processes That Grease the Slippery Slope of Evil

- Mindlessly Taking the First Small Step
- Dehumanization of Others
- De-individuation of Self (anonymity)
- Diffusion of Personal Responsibility
- Blind Obedience to Authority
- Uncritical Conformity to Group Norms
- Passive Tolerance of Evil Through Inaction, or Indifference


Ethics and compliance failure is always a failure of the board. It is not just a management failure.

There is no such thing as a poor company, only a poor board.

- Corrupt regulators and governments vs race to top;
- No reputation or exogenous shock test;
- Industry and past practices justified and generalized;
- Focus on narrow rule correctness, not cumulative effect, spirit or principle;
- Ignorant audit committee who do not understand;
- Living beyond means and not taking vacations;
- Blocking third party expertise (very common);

Reputation Risk: Sources of Risk

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Note: The colours indicate the ratings to these sources of risks.
 Uncoloured sources of risks were not rated as Medium or High at this date.

Risk Rating Key

Very High
 High
 Medium/High
 Medium/High



- Host country Transparency International scale of corruption: de-risk or banishment;
- Code of conduct, conflict of interest policy, related party transactions, sign-off statement, whistle-blowing: all defectively designed and limited controls to oversee;
- Defective D and O sign-off, financial disclosure and controls;
- Application of Code to agents: due diligence of counter-parties;
- No credit and background checks: directors, management, sponsors, donors, staff, other stakeholders;

- Poor employee and agent contracting and management;
- Use of success fees, commission fees, non-expert agents;
- No no gift policy and use of facilitating payments;
- No audit rights to suppliers, customers, and assurance;
- Limited use of expert consultants, for bribery, fraud, pay, expenses;
- Defective training, education of code roll out, especially in corrupt regions and to suppliers;
- Pressure, confidentiality, fiefdoms, no fly zones, and diffuse accountability;

- Lack of record keeping, expenses and accounting practices;
- Focus of contracting is on personal relationships and unfair advantage, not on price, quality and service;
- “Side” agreements or informal practices not approved by the board;
- Use of personal emails, rather than company, and reluctance to document;
- Agent is not paid in the country in which the project takes place;

- Services that agent is to perform and scope of work are opaque;
- Agents who do not disclose the name of a principal from whom they have authority, or sub-agents;
- Lack of involvement of legal and compliance professionals at contract inception stage, bidding/contract stage, and payment stage;
- Exaggeration of qualifications within bidding process, and insertions of high profile personnel for the purpose of the bid;

There is nothing a board cannot control. There is no more power we can give to boards. Ethical failure, I find, is always traced to a board not acting, or acting inappropriately.

Your “To Do” for Monday:

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- Review my slides and select your top five bullet points that may apply to your board or federation;
- Have an in camera session of your board with only independent directors;
- Management must be instructed to leave the room;
- Have a conversation and prioritize;
- Take governance baby steps;
- Remember your leverage: Approval, Information, and Questions.

Thank you!

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THANK YOU!

Q AND A

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Professor **Richard Leblanc** is an award-winning teacher and researcher, consultant, lawyer and specialist on corporate governance and accountability. He is a former recipient of Canada's Top 40 Under 40™ award, received a teaching award as one of the top five university teachers in Ontario, and was named to *Canadian Who's Who*.

- Professor Leblanc's research expertise is in corporate governance, specifically in the effectiveness of boards of directors. He will provide hands on examples of how to maneuver the challenges directors could face based on his extensive service as an external advisor to boards that have won national awards and peer endorsement from institutional shareholders for their corporate governance practices.
- His work, directly or indirectly, has impacted companies throughout the world, including those that have used Dr Leblanc's methodology to strengthen their governance effectiveness and accountability practices.
- Dr. Leblanc brings to business and professional audiences a depth of information from his extensive research and work with over 150 organizations; and training, assessment and development of over 1,000 directors and managers.